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JUDICIAL REFORM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF MEXICO:
THE TRAJECTORY OF THREE YEARS
HICTOR FIX-FIERRO"

INTRODUCTION
An important amendment to several articles of the Constituci6n Politica de los
Estados Mexicanos (1917) [Federal Constitution of Mexico] went into effect on
January 1, 1995.1 Among other significant changed, it undertook to profoundly
transform the organization and powers of the Federal Judiciary. The amendment
represents perhaps the most sweeping alterations in many decades.' Specifically, the
1995 constitutional amendment rearranged the Mexican Supreme Court and granted
it new powers of constitutional review.
However, the Court's new role is not limited to reviewing the constitutionality of
federal and state laws or international treaties. Instead, the amendment broadened
the court's authority to resolve constitutional controversies between federal, state,
and municipal governments. 4 Additionally, it established the Council of the Federal
Judiciary for the governance and administration of all Federal courts, excluding the
Supreme Court.' Finally, it formalized the judicial career, charging it embrace the
principles of 6 "excellence, objectivity, impartiality, professionalism, and

independence."

* Lic. Hector Fix-Fierro received his law degree from UNAM, Facultad de Derecho (1987) and a Master's
Degree at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law of Oftati, Spain in 1994. He also studied law at the
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Germany. Lic. Fix-Fierro has been a full-time researcher at the Instituto de
lnvestigaciones Juridicasde UNAM [Institute of Legal Research of Mexico's National University] since 1991; a fulltime editor of the "Cuademos pam laReforma de Justicia" series [Justice Reform Notebooks]; and, on the Instituto
de la Judicatura Federal [Academic Committee of the Insititute of the Federal Judiciary].
1. See the Diario Oficial de la Federacidn(Official Gazette of the Federation) of December 31, 1994.
According to the eighth transitory article of the amending decree, the modifications to Article 105 of the Constitution
would enter into force together with the corresponding implementing legislation (Ley Reglamentaria de Las
FraccionesIy 11del Articulo 105 de laConstitucidn Politicade los Estados Unidos Mexicanos). This Law was
published on May 11, 1995 in the Diario Oficial and entered into force thirty days after its publication.
2. These changes concerned the appointment of the ProcuradorGeneralde laRepiblica [Attorney General
of the Republic], which now requires confirmation by the Senate (Article 102 A. as amended); the establishment of
a national coordination system for federal, state, and municipal public security agencies; and judicial review of a
public prosecutor's decision not to file criminal charges (Article 21, as amended).
3. For an overview of the evolution of Mexico's judicial institutions during the present century, see Fix
ZAMUDiO, SETENTA y CINCO ANOS DE EVOLUCI6N DEL PODER JUDICIAL EN MXICO. SETENTA Y CINCO ANOS DE

REVOLUCI6N, II, POLITICA 289-382 (1988), and FIX ZAMuDIO & COSSIo DIAZ, EL PODER JUDICIAL EN EL
ORDENAMIENTO MEXICANo 99-137 (1996).

4. See Vargas. The Rebirth of the Supreme Court of Mexico: An Appraisalof PresidentZedillo's Judicial
Reform of 1995, in 11 Am.UJ.nt'l L & Pol'y 295 (1995) and HARV. L REV., Note: Liberalismo Contra
Democracia:Recent JudicialReform in Mexico, in 108 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (1995).
5. See MELGAR ADALtD, EL CONSEJO DE LA JUDICATURA FEDERAL (2nd ed. 1997).
6. Article 100, paragraph six, of the Federal Constitution, as amended. It can be said that until 1994, an
informal judicial career already existed at the Federal Judiciary: young recruits would ascend the internal hierarchy
of judicial posts up to the position of secretario[clerk) at the Supreme Court. From there, they could be appointed
as jueces de distrito
or magistradosde circuito (district or circuit judges] by the court, at the proposal of one of the
ministros [justices]. For an excellent description of the merits and flaws of this system, and of what the author calls
its tutorial and cooperative periods, see Cosslo DIAz, JURISDICCIO6N FEDERAL Y CARRERA JUDICIAL EN MfXuCo (1996).
By contrast, the new Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicialde la Federacidn[Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the
Federation], published on May 26, 1995 in the Diario Oficial,effective the next day introduced a formal recruitaent
system (Articles 106-117). Accordingly, district and circuit judges are now appointed by the Council of the Federal
Judiciary after a concursode oposicidn [competitive examination].
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President Ernesto Zedillo introduced the bill containing the amendments to the
Senate just a few days after taking office. With his support, the amendments were
approved quickly by both Houses of Congress and a majority of the state
legislatures.7 One of the most controversial aspects of the bill was the provision
which forced all twenty-six sitting justices of the Supreme Court into early
retirement.'
Whatever political reasons were behind this decision, the presidential bill

acknowledged that the previous decade's intensive process of economic and political
change required a major reform of the justice system.' Although many citizens
deemed other changes more urgent, such reform would necessarily have to address

the Mexican judiciary's secular, institutional, and political weaknesses'0 . As a result,
one of the bill's express purposes was to reaffirm the Supreme Court's role as a

constitutional court by conferring it new powers and giving its decisions more weight
and authority."
These changes were necessary because Mexico's Supreme Court is perhaps the
least well known and understood of her public institutions. Its central role in the
development of Mexican legal institutions, particularly the amparo suit, is
unquestioned.' 2 However, its social and political significance, especially in recent
times, has been scarcely studied.' 3 This can be partially attributed to the crushing
political dominance of the presidency since the end of the nineteenth century. As a
result, the Supreme Court carefully avoided any major involvement in politically
sensitive issues 4 and cultivated a discrete image to escape public opinion.
The 1994 reform is the most recent attempt to bring the Supreme Court back into
the political and policymaking process.' 5 Indeed, in light of the increasing levels of

7. The bill was passed with some important modifications introduced to it by the Congress. See Fix-ZAMuDlo
& Cosslo DIAz, supra note 3, 548-549.
8. See, the second transitory article of the amending decree.
9. This is the central thesis in CIDAC, ALA PUERTADELALEY. ELESTADODEDERECHO EN MtXtCO (1994).
Zedillo had already expressed this conviction as a presidential candidate in a major campaign speech in the city of
Guadalajara on July 14, 1994, together with a ten-point reform program for a new system of public security and
justice. See ZEDILLO, SEGURIDAD YJUSTICIA, in LAS POLITICAS DEL BIENESTAR (1994). This belief, however, was
shared in many other political and legal circles. Opposition parties made it part of their campaign platforms, and
justices of the Supreme Court prepared and discussed their own reform proposals. The North American Free Trade
Agreement's negotiation and ratification process certainly helped heighten foreign interest the performance of
Mexico's justice system.
10. Taylor, Why No Rule ofLaw in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness ofMexico's Judicial Branch, 27 N.M.
L. REV. 141 (1997), identifies several sources of such weakness and concludes the shortcomings of the 1994 reform
will not cure them.
11. The Exposicirn de motivos [Statement of motives] of the presidential bill, reprinted in FIX ZAMUDIO &
COSSlO DIAZ, supra note 3, 577, 579.
12. See, for example, the important essays collected in LA SUPREMA CORTE Y EL PENSAMIENTO JURIDICO
(1985).
13. For an empirical assessment of the Court's degree of independence vis-a-vis the other branches of
government, See GoNzALEzCAsANovA, LAD occRAciA ENM soco (1st ad. 1965); there is an English translation)
and Schwarz, Judges under the Shadow: JudicialIndependence in the United States and Mexico, 3 CALIF.W.INT'L
Li., 260 (1973). Both studies conclude that the Court has managed to exercise a reasonable degree of independence.
See also GONzALEZ AVELAR, LA CORTE SUPREMA Y LA POLrITCA (2nd ed. 1994), reviewing Supreme Court decisions
until 1957 that dealt with political issues.
14. This reluctance has historical roots that are described in MocrEZUMA BAR RAGAN, JOSt MARIA IGLESiAS
Y LA JUSTICA ELEcroRAL (1994).
15. Some previous attempts have failed, partly because they have not taken the Court seriously as a Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court has never exercised the powers conferred it in Article 97 to investigate electoral violations.
In 1977, as a part of the political reform that legalized the clandestine parties of the left, a new remedy allowed the
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social and political pluralism prevailing in Mexico, the Court's avoidance of its role
in government is dysfunctional. There is no doubt that Mexico's courts will be
increasingly called upon to resolve new and difficult social issues. The reforms have
set the stage for the Court to develop a new assertiveness and occupy a new position
in Mexican social and political life. At a minimum, the "new" Supreme Court is
more visible than ever before. 16
It may be premature to attempt a full-fledged evaluation of the reform's merits and
shortcomings because its impact and benefits will only become apparent over time. 7
It is not premature, however, to review some of the challenges and problems faced
by the Supreme Court in the past three years which may lead to further change. This
article will focus on the National Supreme Court of Justice as both a major actor and
target of reform.
More specifically, this article intends to briefly examine the activities, decisions,
and new legal interpretations of the Court, as well as the problems and challenges it
currently faces. For this purpose, it is divided into four parts. Part I offers a short
overview of the major reforms made after 1917 to the Court's composition and
jurisdiction. These reforms include the major changes introduced in 1987/88 which
in turn build the immediate background for the 1994 Constitutional amendments.
Part 11 describes the Court's principal activities during the last three years,
emphasizing its new interpretations and contributions to legal doctrine. Part III offers
a point of view on the problems and challenges the Court presently faces and how
they may lead to future changes. Part IV offers some brief concluding remarks.
I: THE SUPREME COURT 1917-1994

A. Transition of the Supreme Court's role
1. The Status and the Role of the Federal Judiciary
Before addressing the major changes introduced to the Court's organization and
jurisdiction after 1917, it is important to understand the Court's role and general
situation between 1917 and 1994. Although the bulk of the Court's activity was
concentrated in amparo matters, a strong and independent constitutional doctrine was

Court to review the legality of the federal electoral process, subject to the veto of Congress. The remedy was
eliminated in 1987. According to the 1993 electoral reform, the Court could nominate four federal judges to sit in the
Chamber of second instance of the Federal Electoral Court. In 1996, the Electoral Court itself was incorporated into
the Federal Judiciary and the Supreme Court received the power to nominate all electoral judges. See MOCTEZUMA
BARRAGAN, supra note 14,318 ff, and ILB, 2, (b).
16. Supreme Court decisions seem to be more frequently reported in newspapers, although it may be the cases
are more relevant. Of 1063 newspaper notes on the Court published between February and August 1997. 208 were
classified by the Cou's press department as positive (19.56%), 813 (76.48%) as neutral, and 42 (3,95%) as negative.
The present Supreme Courtjustices seem more willing to give lectures and press conferences, and to express their
views in academic and other non-judicial publications. See the lecures and speeches of the Supreme Court's president
and justices collected in EL NUEVO PODER JUDICIAL DE LA FFZRACI6N (1997) and LA TOGA YLA PALABRA (1997).
The Supreme Court has created a publication series containing the public and private discussion of major cases, a
bi-monthly magazine (Legis Verba) and an interet web-page page. See SUPREMA CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACION.
INFORMES ANUALES (1996) and (1997).
17. For a critical review of the constitutional amendment, See GARCIA RAMIREZ PoDER JUDICIAL Y
MINISTTERiO
Ptmuco (1996).
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not developed. There are several reasons for this. Most of them flow from the
almost absolute dominance enjoyed by the President of the Republic over the two
other branches of government and the political system as a whole.
For example, the amazing ease with which the Constitution could be amended
made it very difficult for the Court to develop, except for in a few legal areas, a broad
and consistent constitutional doctrine. Likewise, the amparo suit has been excluded
by the Constitution or the Court's interpretation from politically sensitive areas. For
instance, elections, agrarian reform, authorizations to establish private schools, and
the expulsion of pernicious foreigners have all been excluded at one time or another.
Some of these exclusions are no longer in force as they have been gradually
eliminated (for example, the authorization to establish private schools). Moreover,
available amparo judgments, especially in the so-called amparo contra leyes [amparo
against judicial decisions], have limited effect.
Another hindrance to the creation of Supreme Court doctrine was the state of
federal courts before 1980. Specifically, the very modest growth in the number of
federal courts and the resources available to them forced procedural dismissals of
amparo suits.' Similarly, the establishment of specialized federal tribunals outside
the Judicial Power of the Federation for labor, fiscal, and agrarian matters weakened
the Supreme Court's authority. This and other limited opportunities to solve conflicts
between the different branches and levels of government through legal means
abrogated the Court's power.1 9 Finally, changes in the terms of office and
appointment procedure of justices and judges limited their term in office.
Thus constrained, it is not surprising the Supreme Court and the Federal Judiciary
occupied a relatively weak position in the Mexican political arena.20 Although they
certainly managed to prevent and correct many violations of citizens' rights by the
public authorities, at other times, they were unnecessarily deferential to those
authorities."' In any case, the Supreme Court was prevented from fully playing its
role as a countervailing power and as the ultimate defender of the Constitution.

18. CIDAC, supra note 9, 63-80.
19. Between 1917 and December 31, 1994, a total of 55 constitutional controversies were filed before the
Supreme Court: 14 between the Federation and a state; 22 among the powers of the same state; 1 between different
states; and 13 between a state and its municipalities. See Cossfo DfAz, Comentario al articulo 105 constitucional,
in CONSTrrUcI6N POLfTCA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS COMENTADA, 1053 (9th ed. 1997). Very few of

these controversies were resolved as to the merits. The most famous was the Oaxaca case, decided in 1932. The case
involved the ownership of artifacts found at the archaeological site in Monte Albdn, Oaxaca. The Federal Government
challenged the Oaxacan state law on the Dominion and Jurisdiction over Archaeological Monuments which the
Supreme Court invalidated because it encroached on federal powers. See FIX-ZAMUDIO, INTRODUCC06N AL EsTUDIO
DE LA DEFENSA DE LA CONSTrrUCI6N EN EL ORDENAMIENTO MEXICANO 53 (1994).
20. For a more direct treatment of the Mexican judiciary's weakness, See TAYLOR, supra note 10. See
ScHWARZ, and GONzALES CASANOVA, supra note 13.
21. CIDAC, supra note 9, 68-73, offers some instances of Supreme Court interpretations that either condoned
or even fostered unintentionally such violations.
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2. Reforms Between 1928 and 196822
In 1917, the amparo suit against judicial decisions was finally accepted by the
Constituent Congress.23 The Court recuperated its original composition of 11
members, working only en banc. The justices were appointed by Congress at the
proposal of local legislatures. In 1928, the number of justices was increased from 11
to 16 and three chambers were reintroduced. The appointment procedure was
modified and the justices were thereinafter appointed by the President of the
Republic and approved by the Senate.
In 1934, a fourth chamber with jurisdiction in labor matters was introduced and
the number of justices increased to 21. In 1951 a fifth auxiliary chamber composed
of five justices was created to help the Court with its tremendous backlog. The first
five Tribunales Colegiados de Circuito [collegiate circuit courts], were modeled on
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. They were established to support the Supreme
Court in deciding some procedural aspects of amparos contra leyes. Although 27,000
amparo suits were transferred to the circuit courts a backlog of more than 8,000
cases in 1960 and 16,000 by the end of 1965 remained.' A new distribution of
jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the circuit courts was attempted in 1968
to alleviate the backlog.
Two important reform bills were introduced into Congress in 1944 and 1959,
though neither passed, addressing the backlog problem. Essentially, both would have
transformed the Supreme Court into a court specialized in constitutional matters.
This was finally accomplished by the 1987/88 and 1994 reforms.25
B. The Supreme Court as a ConstitutionalCourt

1. The Reform of 1987/8826
An important reform entered into force on January 15, 1988. Specifically, the
final decision making power on all amparos contra leyes was transferred to the circuit
courts. However, the final decision on the constitutionality of general legal
provisions remained with the Supreme Court. The Court also maintained the power
to resolve inconsistencies between circuit courts' interpretations. Additionally, it

22. See CABRERA, EL PODER JUDICIAL FEDERAL MEXMCANO Y EL CONSTrrUYENTE DE 1917 (1968); FixZAMUDIO, supra note 3; FIX-ZAMUDIO & Cosslo DIAZ, supra note 3, and TAYLOR, supra note 10.
23. Originally, the amparo suit didn't apply to judicial decisions, per Article 8 of the Amparo Law of 1869.
However, Article 14 of the 1857 Constitution, provided persons could be judged or sentenced only under laws enacted
prior to the case and exactly applicable to it.(no expostfacto). This allowed the Court to consider that a constitutional
right was violated whenever an ordinary law was incorrectly applied by a court. The Court adopted this policy for
complex reasons including mistrust of the state courts. This resulted in the concentration of all ordinary judicial
matters before the Court, giving way to what Emilio Rabasa termed the impossible task of the Supreme Court in his
classic study on Article 14 of the 1857 Constitution. It also had the effect of obliterating the functions of the Court

as an organ of constitutional control in favor of its role as a guardian of ordinary legality.
24. Id., at 306.

25. Id., at 301-302, 305. The first bill, proposed by the President of the Republic, failed due to opposition by
the Court. The second, proposed by a senator, was dismissed by the Senate as too radical. See also BRENA SESMA,
Un 'radical'proyecta de reformas al PoderJudicial,in REFORMAS AL PODER JUDICIAL, 37-44 (Mario Melgar Adalid

ed., 1995).
26. See Fix-ZAMUDIo, La Suprema Corte como tribunal constitucional, in LAS NUEVAS BASES
CoNsTrIcTIONALES Y LEGALES DEL SISTEMA JUDICIAL MEXICANO. LA REFORMA JURIDICIAL 1986-1987, 345-90

(1987).
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received new administrative and governance powers, such as the power to establish
new courts and, in general, a broader administrative autonomy.
2. A New Beginning? The Reforms of 1994 and 1996
a) The 1994 reform

The 1994 reform carried the previous reforms further. It introduced changes that
brought the Supreme Court closer to a European-style constitutional court, but
without completely abandoning its roots in the American model of constitutional
justice.27 The changes made to that end were:
• The Court is again composed of 11 justices, who will stay in office for a fixed,
non-renewable period of 15 years;s
" The transfer of governance and administration of the federal courts, excluding
the Supreme Court itself, to the Council of the Federal Judiciary;29

" The introduction, in Article 105 section H of the Constitution of the 'abstract'
actions of unconstitutionality;" and,
" The new regulation of the constitutional controversies between the federal,
state, Federal District, and municipal governments in Article 105 section II of
the Constitution.
Additionally, actions of unconstitutionality and constitutional controversy are to
be decided directly and exclusively by the Supreme Court sitting en banc. The

Supreme Court is subjected, however, to two important limitations. First, electoral
matters were exempted from review. Second, while the Court may invalidate erga

omnes [with general effects] a legal provision it deems unconstitutional, it may do so
only with a qualified majority of eight votes out of eleven. This type of vote is
difficult to achieve, especially where controversial constitutional issues are
involved.3

27. For a brief description of the differences and converging trends between the U.S. and the Austrian (or
European) models of constitutional adjudication, See CAPPELLEmI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE

PERSPFenVE, 132-49 (1989).
28. Until December 1994, Supreme Court justices could only be removed from office for a good cause and
were subject to mandatory retirement at age 70. The present fixed-term system, with no mandatory retirement age,
has been criticized because it allegedly eliminated the life tenure [inamovilidad] of Supreme Court justices. However,
the majority of justices rarely stayed in the Court for long. Many justices retired after a few years to move to more
politically attractive positions, such as governor of a state. The average term of the 79 justices appointed after 1947
and who retired before December 1994 is 10.27 years. 36 justices (45%) remained for a longer period (up to 29
years); and 43 justices (55%) did not complete 10 years(one served under one year); 62 justices (78%) stayed in office
less than fifteen years. The new rules increase the likelihood judges will complete the 15 year term. (estimates based
on data from FIX-ZAMuDIO & Cossfo DfAZ, supra note 3, 630-33).

29. Constitutional courts usually do not belong to the ordinary court system and consequently do not have any
governing or administrative responsibilities with respect to it.
30. Acciones de inconstitucionalidad. This action is called abstract because the plaintiff is not required to
demonstrate a specific legal interest(standing).
31. In the case of constitutional controversies, laws challenged from below (for example, a federal law
challenged by a state government or a state law challenged by a municipal government) are not subject to this
requirement. However, they cannot be invalidated with general effects[erga onnes], thus impacting only the case
at hand [interpartes]. Therefore, a federal law successfully challenged by a state as unconstitutional is invalid only
in the territory of that state.
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b) The 1996 Reform
The exception of electoral matters was eliminated as a part of an important federal
reform in 1996.32 Consequently, local and national political parties may now
challenge electoral laws.3 Further, the Federal Electoral Court was incorporated into
the Judicial Power of the Federation and its organization and jurisdiction were
redefined. Specifically, the Chamber of Deputies now appoints electoral judges at
the proposal of the Supreme Court. Two new procedures, which redress violations
of political-electoral rights citizens' and unconstitutional determinations of state
electoral authorities, were established and entrusted to the Electoral Court. These
procedures form a special kind of electoral arnparo suit.
Decisions by the Electoral Court of the Judicial Power of the Federation [Electoral
Court], as its name now officially reads, cannot be further challenged and are not
subject to any form of review by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may only
resolve the contradictions that arise between its own and the Electoral Court's
constitutional interpretations and precedents.3'
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S ACTIVITIES 1995-1997

A. Actions of Unconstitutionalityand ConstitutionalControversies
1. Actions of Unconstitutionality
According to the official statistics of the Supreme Court, only one action of
unconstitutionality was filed with the Court in 1995. In 1996 the number increased
to eight, and in 1997, to sixteen.3" Fifteen judgments were published between April
of 1995 and January of 1998.36 All but one of the actions concerned the
constitutionality of local and federal electoral laws. Five actions were dismissed for
procedural reasons. One because the party that brought it had no standing for lack
of official registration as a political party. 7 Another for having not been brought
within the constitutionally stipulated time frame."

32. See ANDRADE SANCHEZ, LA REFORMA POLITICA DE 1996 EN M xIco (1997).
33. The constitution now explicitly states that the constitutional challenge under Article 105, section II, is the
only procedure to challenge the constitutionality of electoral laws.
34. CONST., Ail. 99. 5.
35. See Suprema Corte de Justicia de Ia Nacidn, Informes anuales (1995), (1996) and (1997) and Table 2,
below.
36. Actions of Unconstitutionality [Acci6n de Inconstitucionalidad] (hereinafter AdD 195, in 3 Semanario
Judicial de [a Federacin y su Gaceta (hereinafter:SJF; all references to the ninth epoch [novena 6poca. An "6poca"
is started each time an important reform is made to the structure and jurisdiction of the Federal Judiciary. So for
example, the seventh period was started in 1968 and the eighth in 1988.], March, 84 (1996); Ad! 1/96, in 3 SJF,
March, 350-434 (1996)NEST1F)RM(Ad/7/96, 6/96, 8/96, 9/96 and 10/96, in 5 SJF, February, 357, 373, 411, 436,
470 (1997); Ad! 2/97, in 5 S/F, March, 567 (1997); Ad[ 5196, in 5 SJF, April, 107 (1997); Ad[ 3/97, in 5 SJF,May,
397 (1997); Ad! 6/97, in 6 SJF, December, 447 (1997); Adl 7/97, 8/97, 9/97 and 10/97, in 7 SJF,January, 677, 653,
778 and 735 (1998)". Adl 9/97, in Diario Oficial de laFederacidn, January 511 (1998).)
37. Adl 7196, supra note 36.
38. Adi 2/97 and 3/97, supra note 36. CONST. art. 105, Sec. 11, 2 requires challenges to the constitutionality

of new laws be filed within 30 days of their publication.
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Two actions were dismissed by a vote of six to five. The first39 referred to the Law
of Citizens' Participation for the Federal District (1995). This law established
consejos ciudadanos [citizens' councils]" in each of the sixteen administrative
districts of the capital. The law prohibited political parties from nominating their
own candidates for these councils.41
The minority in the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District, which had passed
this law, challenged it before the Court. They claimed the law violated the
constitutional right of parties to nominate candidates for popular elections granted to
them by Articles 41 and 122 of the Constitution. The majority of the Court held the
claim fell under the electoral matters exception and ordered a dismissal. Specifically,
it held that:
...although it is true that from a theoretical or doctrinal point of view a distinction
can be drawn between the right to nominate and the nomination itself, such
difference lacks support in the positive law, on account that the former is a right
intended to be exercised precisely in the electoral process, and which cannot be
separated from the effect or consequence sought through it, which is no other

than to intervene in that process.42

The two dissenting opinions sought to circumvent the electoral exception. The first
argued that not every election belonged in the category of electoral matters. It further
argued that citizens' councils were not one of the organs of government of the
Federal District provided for by Article 122. Interestingly, it also argued that the
violations claimed by the plaintiffs were not sufficient to challenge the validity of the
law. The challenged provisions were based on the Statute of Government for the
Federal Distric 3 which was passed and amended by the Congress of the Union.
Therefore, this Statute could not be implicitly declared unconstitutional and
invalidated by the Court in the proceedings at hand.'
The second dissenting opinion, formulated by four justices, attempted to dissociate
the right of political parties to nominate candidates for popular election from electoral
matters. The opinion arrived at a restrictive and procedural concept of such matters.
Consequently, the right to nominate a candidate was viewed as belonging to the
broader category of political rights and as necessarily pre-existing the electoral
process proper.45
The second action for unconstitutionality was dismissed on grounds that the
secretary general of the political party did not legally represent the party. The
minority opinion criticized the majority's decision, considering it too rigorous and

39. Adl 1/95, supra note 38.
40. Consejos ciudadanos (citizen councils].
41. Understandably, the parties sought ways to circumvent the prohibition by supporting candidates of their
political affinity and by making this somehow known to the citizenry.
42. P. CXXX95, Ad) 1/95, supra note 36, 84-85 (translation by HFF). "P." refers to the full Court [Plenol;
the Roman number indicates that it is an isolated thesis or interpretation that might not be binding precedent,
depending on the vote. Binding precedents are designated by "" (jurisprudencia),followed by Arabic numbers.
43. Estatuto de Gobierno del Distrito Federal(1994), as amended.
44. Voto particulardel Ministro Castro y Castro, Adl 1/95, supranote 36, 224.
45. Voto de ninoria de los MinistrosAguirreAnguiano,Azuela Giiitrdn,
GdngoraPimentel y Gudifio Pelayo,

Ad) 1/95, supra note 36, 238. Although the exception for "electoral matters" has been removed from the Constitution
with regard to the actions of unconstitutionality, it is still applicable to the constitutional controversies, so this
discussion on the definition of "electoral matters" may become relevant again in the future.
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formalistic. In other words, it was not conducive to the central purpose of an action
of unconstitutionality: to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution over ordinary
legislation.46
In addition to the two actions of unconstitutionality which were dismissed, ten
actions were decided on the merits. Eight of the ten cases sustained the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. In two cases the court partially invalidated the local
statutory provisions challenged.

One action involved the constitutionality of the General Law that Establishes the
Coordination Bases for the National System of Public Security. 47 The parliamentary
minority that challenged it essentially claimed the law conflicted with Article 129 of
the Constitution. Article 129 prohibits military authorities from exercising functions
not strictly connected with military discipline in times of peace. In this case, the
Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of the Navy were made members of
the National Council of Public Security. The Court held that participation of the
Armed Forces in actions related to public security is constitutional. However, the
express request of civilian authorities, the strict subordination to such authorities, and
subordination to the laws are required. 4
Four actions challenged different aspects of the 1996 amendments to the Federal
Code of Electoral Institutions and Processes.49 The most controversial issues were
the changes to the public financing and accounting procedures of political parties.
However, the Court unanimously declared them constitutional and no legal provision
was invalidated.5 °
The 1996 electoral reform introduced important improvements to the regime of
public financing and the monitoring mechanisms for enforcing the respective rules.
A substantial increase in the amount of public funds served as the catalyst for the two
main opposition parties filing an action of unconstitutionality.
The new rules increased funding to approximately 2 billion pesos, or about 280
million U.S. dollars, for the 1997 electoral year. The increase was justified publicly
by the President of the Republic for reasons of State. The purpose was to make
public financing the predominant form of funding for the parties, consequently
reducing their dependence on private donation. Both opposition parties challenged
the new procedures for calculating a minimum campaign cost. The procedures form
the basis from which their allocation of public funds would be made. The Supreme
Court ruled the procedures were not unconstitutional.
The five state electoral actions of unconstitutionality arose in Oaxaca, Baja
California (two) and Chihuahua (two), but resulted only in the partial invalidation of

46. Voto de minoria de los Ministros Aguirre Anguiano, Azuela, Gdngora Pirnentel, Gudiho Pelayo y Sdnchez
Cordero, Adl 5/96, supra note 36, 119, 123. 125. Moreover, the justices noted that no one had challenged the

plaintiffs standing nor had he alleged and proven it. (at 124, 128).
47. Ley General que Establece las Bases de Coordinacidn del Sistema National de Seguridad P'iblica(1996).
48. P. XXVIII96, Ad! 1/96, supra note 36, 350, 436-437.
49. C6digo Federalde Institucionesy Procesos Electorates(CFIPE)(1990), as amended.

50. AdI6/96, 8/96, 9/96 and 10/96, supra note 36. See binding precedents P./J.
32/97, P.IJ.
33/97 and P./J.
34/97 on the public financing of political patties, in 5 SJF June, 339 (1997). reproduced in the Anexw at Informe

Anual,39-43 (1997). National political parties receive public funds for the different kinds of activities they carry out
(CoNsT. art. 41). They receive money for participating in federal electoral campaigns, for access to communication
media, and for research activities and publications. Part of the money is distributed according to the electoral force

of each party (number of votes obtained in the last election), and another is allocated on an equal basis.
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two statutory provisions."' First, the invalidated Oaxacan provision granted political
parties an additional amount of money for an electoral year in which the state's
governor would be elected. The Supreme Court decided that the provision could not
be applied during the electoral process of 1998. Simply, it had not been promulgated
and published at least 90 days before the beginning of such process as mandated by
Article 105 section II of the Constitution. Second, the Chihuahua provision was
invalidated for insufficient definitions, and the state legislature was ordered to correct
it by defining two missing subsections.
2. Constitutional controversies
According to official statistics of the Supreme Court, 21 constitutional
controversies were filed in 1995, 63 in 1996, and 32 in 1997.52 Between April 1995
and January 1998, 24 judgments and incidental decisions on constitutional
controversies were published. 3 All suits but three were brought by municipalities
against state governments. Four controversies were dismissed on procedural
grounds.-'
Several of the challenges concerned the powers of a state legislature to fix salaries
for members of municipal governments. These controversies centered on state
legislature's powers to approve budgets, review the use of public funds, and
promulgate laws regarding the official accountability of municipal public servants.
Essentially, these challenges questioned the power of the state comptroller general
to intervene in municipal finances. 5 Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that such powers
provided for in the state Constitution were in contradiction with the autonomy
granted to them by Article 115 of the Federal Constitution.
The Court ruled unanimously that municipalities were autonomous but not
sovereign. That is, their autonomy does not preclude the state legislature from
56
moderating the power of a municipal government to approve its own budget.

51. Ad! 6/97,7/97, 8/97, 9/97 and 10/97, supra note 36..
52. See Suprenta Corte de Justicia de ia Nacidn, Informes Anuales (1995), (1996) and (1997) and Table 2,
below.

53. Not all judgments are published. Similar controversies are resolved by similar judgments, and only one
is published. Several judgments concern controversies that were filed before the constitutional amendment entered
into force.

54. One of them, because the plaintiff failed to move in a two-year period; in another, the plaintiff withdrew
its claim; and a in third one, the constitutional controversy was not the appropriate action to challenge an ordinary
court decision. See Controversiaconstitucional2/94; controversiaconstitucional 12/95, in 5 SJF, May, 409, 416
(1997), controversia constitucional 1/94, in 5 SJF, March, 579 (1997); Controversiaconstitucional18/95, in 5 SJF,

June, 562 (1997).
55. Controversiaconstitucional 3/93, in 3 SJF, March, 262 (1996); controversiaconstitucional 13/95, in 3
SJF, June, 394 (1996); controversiaconsitucional4/95, in 4 SJF, July, 240 (1996); controversiaconstitucional8/95,
in 4 SJF, August, 304 (1996); controversiaconstitucional9/95, in 4 SJF, September, 402 (1996). All these actions
were brought by several municipalities, governed by an opposition party, of the northern State of Nuevo L-e6n.

56. However, in subsequent controversies, two justices decided to change their opinion, and considered

instead that Max. CoNsT. Article 115, section IV, was clear that although the state legislatures had the power to pass
the municipalities' revenue laws (municipal taxes), but also the municipal governments alone had the power to
approve their own budgets, including the remuneration for municipal officials, without the intervention of any other
agency. See Voto minoritariode los Mistros GudiRfo Pelayo y Aguirre Anguisno, controversiaconstitucional 13/95,
supra note 55,446. CoNsT. art. 115, sec. IV, '13 states: "State legislatures shall pass the municipalities' revenue laws

and shall review their public accounts. Budgets shall be approved by the municipal governments on the basis of their
available income". CONST. art. 115, sec.1V refers generally to the financial autonomy of municipalities.
Municipalities may freely administer their revenue, such as real-estate taxes.
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Another challenge concerned the powers of the state legislature to establish an
administrative tribunal for hearing claims brought by private citizens against the state
and municipal public administration. The plaintiff argued the state government had
to either establish a separate tribunal or sign an agreement with the municipalities
allowing controversies against them to be brought before the state tribunal. 7
An amendment to the state Constitution and Organic Law of the State Judicial
Power was also challenged. The amendment conferred on the State Superior Court
of Justice the power to resolve all kinds of disputes between two municipalities and
between municipalities and the state governments. The Court rejected the claim that
this power was inconsistent with and encroached upon the powers of the federal
courts. While a state court may decide constitutional conflicts, it may do so only with
reference to the state Constitution. It is an exclusive power of the federal courts to
decide federal constitutional questions."
In another suit, the establishment of a State Institute for Municipal Development
with training, advisory, and research functions was challenged. The Court held these
functions were not an unconstitutional intervention in the responsibilities entrusted
to municipal governments.59
The creation of the Board for Moral, Civic, and Material Betterment of the State
of Nuevo Le6n was also challenged. The Court held the Board did not encroach
upon the constitutional functions of the municipal government nor intervene between
the state and municipality. They found that the board was not an "intermediate
authority" exercising independent and unilateral decision-making powers because its
funding was approved by the state legislature. Furthermore, the Board was held to
not effect the autonomous economic administration of the municipalities.'
Only one municipality was able to win its case against a state government. The
municipal government of Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas, successfully challenged a provision
in the state Constitution which gave the governor the power to appoint a chief of
police in each municipality. The Court held this power to be unconstitutional since
the Federal Constitution reserves to municipalities control of public security. This
includes the power to appoint and remove police officials.6"
Of the three other controversies mentioned, one case was brought by a state
against the federal government to prevent the Attorney General of the Republic from
investigating the alleged misuse of electoral campaign funds. The state considered
the investigation an invasion of its sovereignty. In the second case, a municipality
challenged a section of the Federal Budget which grants certain funds to state and
municipal governments. Plaintiffs claimed they were a part of the municipal treasury
and therefore subject to its free administration. The third case involved a challenge
by the federal government to municipal regulations.
In the first case, the Court ruled that a federal criminal investigation does not
invade a state's jurisdiction. It also held that the federal public prosecutor had an
57. Controversia constitucional 1/95, in 3 SJF,May, 315 (1996)
58. Controversia constitucional7/95, in 4 SJF,September, 359 (1996).
59. Controversia constirucional6/96, in 5 SJF, March, 584 (1997). In the same sense were 21 other
controversies resolved, all brought by municipal governments of the State of Oaxaca.
60. Controversia constitucional 2/95, in 5 SJF, June, 344 (1997).
61. Controversia constitucional 19/95, in 4 SJF November, 250 (1996). Since this controversy was filed by
a municipality against a state govemient, the declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged provision in the state
Constitution did not invalidate it vis-a-vis the rest of the state's municipalities.
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obligation to investigate alleged federal crimes.62 In the second case, the Court
rejected the challenge to a section of the federal budget. The section contained
federal revenue shares, which can be freely administrated by municipal governments.63 In the third case, the Court invalidated the Regulations for the Protection
and Security of Banks of the Municipality of Guadalajara, Jalisco. The Court ruled
that it encroached upon the exclusive federal power to regulate banking institutions,
including the devices and actions required for their protection and security.'
B. Amparo Proceedings

The Supreme Court has established new and important binding interpretations and
isolated precedents in amparo proceedings. Some of the most relevant are described
hereafter.
1. Constitutional rights
a. Freedom of association
The Court declared the mandatory affiliation of businesses with the chambers of
industry and commerce to be in conflict with Article 9 of the Constitution. 65 The
laws in two states which permitted only one employee union in government
departments and agencies were also invalidated.66
b. Excessive fines
The Court ruled the prohibition of excessive fines in Article 22 of the Constitution
comprises all kinds of fines, not only those imposed as a criminal sanction. The
Court further ruled that fixed fines that do not take into account the specific
circumstances of the violation or of the offender are unconstitutional.67
c. Administrative arrest for contempt of court
The Court decided that an arrest for contempt of court may not exceed 36
hours. 69 The ruling analogized limits imposed by Article 21 of the Constitution
which provides limits for an arrest as a sanction for administrative violations.
d. Proportionality and equitableness of taxes
Article 31 section IV of the Federal Constitution states that Mexican citizens
have the obligation to contribute to the public expenses of the Federation, the Federal
District, or the State or municipality in which they reside. The contribution is "in the

62. Controversia constitucional11/95, in 3 SJF, May, 362 (1996). See the binding interpretations with

numbers PJ1. 31/96 to 39/96, in 3 SIF,June, 385-394 (1996).
63. Participacionesfiscalesfederales.
See Cuntroversia constitucional 695, in 5 SJF, June, 421 (1997).
64. Controversia constitucional 56/96, in 6 SJF, July, 173 (1997). The judgment was also published in the
"Diario Oficial de ia Federaci6n", July 14, 1997, second section.
65. P./J.
28/95, in Anexo al informe anual, 37-38 (1995).
66. P. 1/97, in Anexo al informe anual,91-92 (1997).
67. P./J.
7/95, PJJ. 9/95 and PJJ. 10/95, in Anexo al informe anual, 14-18 (1995).
68. Arresto como medio de apremio. Arrest as a method of applying pressure.
69. P./J.
23/95, in Anexo al informe anual. 31-32 (1995).
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proportional and equitable manner provided for by the laws."70 The Court reviewed
a great number of tax laws relating to this section and found some to be

unconstitutional.7' The Court also extended and applied the requirement of
equitableness to fees charged by the state for public services.7
e. Domiciliary visits
Article 16 of the Constitution allows public authorities to carry out domiciliary

visits for the purpose of monitoring the compliance of taxpayers with tax laws. The
Court issued some binding and isolated interpretations that further define and

circumscribe the rights of citizens. The interpretations also spoke to the obligations
and prohibitions on officials carrying out a visit. For example, officials may not take
accounting books to the tax authority's offices for inspection."
f. Access to the courts

The Court ruled that requiring mandatory exhaustion of conciliation proceedings
before resorting to the courts contradicts the guarantee contained in Article 17 of the

Constitution.74

2. Jurisdiction and procedure in amparo matters
The Supreme Court has been very active in defining and redefining some
jurisdictional and procedural aspects of the amparo suit:
a. Non-compliance with amparo judgments
Reversing a previous interpretation, the Court ruled non-compliance exists not
only when the public authority completely fails to comply with an amparo judgment,

but also when compliance is not effective. That is, an authority is in non-compliance
when they take action that can viewed as secondary, preliminary, or insignificant
regarding an amparo ruling. 5

70. MEx.CONST. art. 31 § IV.
71. For example, the impuestos al activo de las empresas [tax on business assets], which the Court declared
unconstitutional a few years ago, because doesn't give taxpayers the opportunity to offset it with their income tax.
However, some interpretations were adopted by a majority of six votes, which don't constitute binding precedent.
See P. XLVI/95 and XLVII/95, in Anexo al informe anual, 104-105 (1995). However, the Court held also that the
exemption of financial institutions from this tax violated the principle of equitableness. PJJ. 10/96, in Anexo al
informe anual,22-23 (1996). On the elements that define tax equitableness, See PJJ. 41/97 and PJJ. 42/97, in Anexo
al informe anual,50-52 (1997).
72. So, for example, PJJ. 21/95 (fees for the discharge of water in the public sewers) and PJJ. 26/95 (fees
for the use of air space by aircraft), both in Anexo al informe anual,29-30, 34-36 (1995).
73. PJ. 5295, in Anexo al informe anual, 11-12 (1996). Officials may place a seal or mark on accounting
books and correspondence, in order to secure them, but not on furniture, file cases and offices. See P. IV/96 and P.
CXXV/95, in Anexo al informe anual, 97-98, 88 (1996).
74. P. CXII/97, in Anexo al informe anual, 177-178 (1997).
75. P. LXV/95, in Anexo al informe anual, 19-20 (1995). Non-compliance is a significant problem with
amparo judgements as attested by the number of related petitions the Supreme Court has to decide each year. Under
the Constitution (MEx. CONST. art. 107, § XVI), any public official who repeats the action challenged in amparo or
who evades compliance with the judgement shall be immediately removed from office and prosecuted before a district
judge. However, the Supreme Court has rarely used this power (recently, it removed an official of the government
of the Federal District, in a case that concerned license plates for public transportation two years after the amparo
judgement). MFX. CONST. art. 107 § XVI was also amended in 1994. The amendment allows the Supreme Court
to find the non-compliance excusable or inexcusable. If it is inexcusable and the offending public authority has had
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b. Suspension of challenged actions
Under certain circumstances, an action by a public authority that is challenged
through an amparo suit may be suspended for the duration of the proceedings. The
Court ruled that in ordering a suspension or injunction, the judge may consider the
nature of the right and alleged violation involved. That is, the judge may consider
that the final judgment will grant the protection sought by the
the probability
76
plaintiff.
c. Concept of public authority for amparo suits
The amparo suit can only be used to challenge actions by public authorities.
Consequently, the concept of public authority is of central importance to the
admissibility of a suit. The Court formulated a broader concept than established in
the 1920's which was restrictive.77 According to the new definition, a public
authority is any official of a public agency who can legally adopt unilateral actions
that create, modify, or extinguish the rights of citizens.78 This concept is designed
to include actions by public decentralized organisms, such as PEMEX, against which
the amparo suit was generally unavailable. This new definition has the potential of
agencies, such as
expanding constitutional protection against actions by public
79
utilities, which are not considered part of the government.
d. Amparo against constitutional amendments
The Court recently dealt with whether a constitutional amendment could be
reviewed through an amparo proceeding. The Court decided by a vote of six to five
that the concept of laws in Article 103 section I of the Constitution should be given
a broad meaning. Therefore, the legislative process that results in a constitutional
amendment can be challenged but the amendment's substance cannot. 80
e. Amparo against the public prosecutor for not bringing criminal charges
The 1994 constitutional amendment incorporated in Article 21 the ability to
challenge a public prosecutor's decision not to bring criminal charges. Since this

a reasonable period of time to comply with the judgement the Supreme Court can remove him from office. The new
constitutional regulation also provides for other sanctions including compensatory damages. The amendment has not
yet entered into force, pending the amendment of the Law of Amparo.
76. P./J. 15/96 and PJJ. 16/96, inAnexo al informe anual, 28-30 (1996).
77. This restrictive definition worked later to a certain extent as protection against rising caseloads.
78. P. XXVII/97, in Anexo al informeanual, 112-13 (1997).
79. Organismospdblicosdescentralizados [public decentralized organisms] are governmental agencies which
enjoy varying degrees of autonomy including regulatory powers. They have legal personality (incorporation) and
manage their own funds. Public decentralized organisms include state monopolies like Petr6leos Mexicanos (Pemex)
or the Comisi6n Federal de Electricidad (CFE), the governmental commissions for the protection of human rights,
and public universities like the National University (UNAM), and the central bank (Banco de M6xico).
80. Amparo en revisin 1995/96, in 5 SJF, March, 497, 562 (1997). The minority opinion considered that
this interpretation could have harmful effects, since the courts cannot be certain of the constitutional provisions which
might conflict with statutes.
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provision has not been implemented by ordinary legislation, the Court recently
decided that the amparo suit is available in these cases before a district judge."'
C. Other Proceedings
1. Review of Council of the Federal Judiciary decisions
Pursuant to Article 100 of the Federal Constitution decisions of the Council of the
Federal Judiciary are final and not subject to further challenge. However, decisions
that concern the appointment, assignment, and removal of district and circuit judges
can be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The review is limited to "verifying that they
82
have been adopted according to the rules set forth by the respective organic law.
Between 1995 and 1997, a total of 22 administrative review proceedings were
filed with the Supreme Court. 3 The Court has issued some important interpretations:
" The Supreme Court has the power to carry out a careful and complete review
of the procedure, facts, evidence, motives, and grounds that support the
decision of the Council, and to determine if the formal and substantive
requirements of the law have been satisfied;"
" The completion of a six-year judicial term does not allow the Council to
prevent judges from staying in office unless the Council justifies their decision
denying a judges continued service. Any other5 interpretation would run counter
to the newly created judicial career system;
" The clerk temporarily replacing a circuit judge who was removed for bad
behavior may start the administrative review procedure;8 6 and,
" On charges of notorious ineptitude or negligence by a judge, the Council of the
Federal Judiciary may not review the legality of judicial decisions. However,
the Council may assess the foundations and motives that support a decision to
determine if a judge's attitude displayed in a decision is consistent with the
nature of judicial functions.87
Thus, the Court had the opportunity to decide some important issues related to its
own powers and the powers of the Council of the Federal Judiciary. While the Court
does not appoint or remove federal judges anymore, it may play an important role in
shaping the legal status, rights, and responsibilities of the Federal Judiciary.

81. PJJ. 91/97 and P. CLXIV to P. CLXVII, in Anexo at informe anual,suplemento noviembre, 16-17, 45-49
(1997).
82. MEX. CONST. art. 100.
83. See Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Naci&n, !nformes anuales, (1995), (1996) and (1997), as well as

Table 2, below.
84. P. XXI/96, inAnexo al informe anual, 110-111 (1996).

85. P. XLD/97, in Anexo a! informe anual,130-131 (1997). In other words: the six-year term to which Article
97 of the Constitution refers does not conclude by the mere lapse of time. It necessarily requires a decision by the
Council ratifying, promoting or denying ratification to the judge concerned. The absence of a qualified majority
needed for ratification (five votes out of seven) is not equivalent to non-ratification. P. LI/97, in Anexo at informe
anual, 133-134 (1997).
86. P. CXLII/97, in Anexo al informe anual,204-205 (1997).
87. P. CXLV/97, inAnexo al informe anual,205-206(1997).
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2. Article 97 investigation
Article 97, second paragraph, of the Federal Constitution states that the Supreme
Court:
[M]ay appoint one or several of its members, a District or a Circuit judge, or
designate one or several special commissioners, whenever it so deems to be
convenient, or at the request of the Federal Executive, a Chamber of the
Congress of the Union or the governor of a state, only for the purpose of
investigating an event or events that may result in a grave violation of an
individual guarantee. 8
In March 1996 the President of the Republic requested the Supreme Court conduct
an investigation on the tragic events of June 1995 pursuant to this provision. 9
The Court designated two justices to carry out the investigation. The justices,
acting as would a Special Master, collected evidence and interviewed government
officials and other interested persons. Their report was adopted by the full Court on
April 23, 1996, and sent to the President of the Republic, the Congress, the Attorney
General, and the governor and Superior Court of Justice of Guerrero. 90 The report
concluded that a grave violation of individual guarantees had occurred and that
several officials of the state government, including the governor at the time, were
directly responsible for the cover-up that followed the investigated events.
The Court was assigned to investigate the matter in hopes that its report would
have credibility in the public opinion. 9' However, the Court was well aware the
report's findings would not have any legal consequences. 92 Nevertheless, it was
unfortunate the report had no visible effects 93 other than the precedents and
interpretations issued on the scope and meaning of its investigative powers under
Article 97.'"
IlI. THE SUPREME COURT: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

A. Position andpowers
The 1994 reform has several technical errors that can and should be corrected,
such as the requirement of eight votes for the invalidation of a law with general
effects.

88. Translation by H.F.F.. This power was last used in 1946 to investigate a massacre in the State of
Guanajuato. See MocmEZUMABARRAGAN, supranote 15, 320-321.
89. Solicitu&196, in 3 SJF, June, 460 (1996). In Aguas Blancas, Guerrero, the police killed 17 persons and
wounded 20.
90. Id., at 511.
91. It should be noted that prior to the Court's intervention, the National Commission of Human Rights had
conducted an investigation and made recommendations that led to the resignation or prosecution of several high
officials of the state government. For this reason, the Court rejected previous petitions by private organizations to
exercise its powers under Article 97.
92. Id., at 468.
93. The governor took a voluntary leave of absence during the proceedings to prevent the possibility he might
obstruct or interfere with the investigation.
94. P. LXXXVI/96 to P. XC/96, in 3 SJF, June, 459, 513-517 (1996) and Anexo al informe anual, 162-166
(1996).
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However, an aspect that will be much more difficult to modify is the position of
the Supreme Court itself. Much as the U.S. Supreme Court does, the Court now
enjoys a rather ambiguous position as both a constitutional court and the highest
ordinary court of the country. While this situation is not completely unproblematic
in the United States, it is made manageable by the Supreme Court's discretionary
power. Specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court may select its caseload by certiorari.
Also, U.S. state courts, where most cases are heard and finally judged, have a high
degree of autonomy.
Conversely, Mexican courts have no power of certiorari nor are the state courts as
autonomous as their U.S. counterparts. The issue is further complicated by new
functions the Court has assumed following the European model of constitutional
courts. Clearly, the most desirable solution would have been to create from the
beginning, as many civil-law countries have done, a separate constitutional court
alongside an ordinary Supreme Court. Such a solution is not likely to be realized any
time soon, so the existing institutional design will have to be taken as an appropriate
basis for further developments.
B. Workload
The Presidential Bill of December 1994 justified reducing the number of justices
by stating the Supreme Court's backlog was practically non-existent. Furthermore,
the bill said the proposed reduction would not generate a new backlog because the
Court's administrative functions would be transferred to the Council of the Federal
Judiciary.a" However, the bill understated both the backlog and impact of the
reduction. The new Court started with a backlog of 2,366 filings in February 1995.
Furthermore, the new responsibilities of the Court combined with the old ones have
translated into a considerable and growing workload, as shown by the following
tables:

95. Statement of motives [Exposiciin de Motivos], supra note II, 583-584.
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Table 1
Supreme Court dispositions
(December 1, 1994-November 30, 1997)

Source: Annual Reports, Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (Pres=disposition
by president; Drf=draft resolution by a justice).
Table 1 shows that the Supreme Court's total workload has steadily increased
between 1995 and 1997, although. the Court has been able to achieve a modest
reduction in the backlog at the end of each year.
Table 2
Average number of draft resolutions per justice
(December 1, 1994-November 30, 1997)
1994-95

1995-96

1996-97

1993

(n=3037)

(n=3559)

(n=3558)

(n=4760).

/10

/10

/10

/25

Variation
(%)

94-97

93-97

+17.2

+87.3

Average number of draft
resolutions per justice

303.7

355.9

355.8

190.4

Source: Annual Reports, Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.
Table 2 shows that Supreme Court justices are working as hard as ever. At the end
of 1997, the justices were submitting to the Court, on the average, 17% more
ponencias [draft resolutions]' than in 1995, and more than 87% in comparison with

96. The total number has been divided by ten because the president of the Court doesn't usually submit draft
resolutions, but does vote.
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the 1993 Court. Although the number of clerks 97 at the service of each justice has
increased to seven, there are limits to the amount of work that a justice can direct and
supervise.
Table 3
Matters before the Supreme Court
(December 1, 1994-November 30, 1997)
Type of case

1994-95

1995-96

1996-97

Total

1993

Amparo suits

2 652

3-281

2 175

8 108

2722

Contradictory rulings

320

219

215

754

212

Const. controversies

21

63

32

116

1

Actions of unconst..

1

8

16

25

Non-compliance

916

945

394

2 255

477

Administrative review

1

4

17

22

----

Jurisdictional conflicts

543

409

456

1 409

391

Source: Annual Reports, Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.
Are there possibilities for relieving the Court of some of its burden? Table 3 shows
the main categories of matters decided by the Court. The most numerous are amparo
suits, contradictory interpretations of circuit courts' opinions, incidental petitions
regarding non-compliance with amparo judgments, and jurisdictional conflicts. In
relation to this, two proposals might bring some relief to the Court:
• The establishment of a superior chamber of the circuit courts composed of
circuit judges which would decide non-constitutional business. This business
includes contradictory interpretations, jurisdictional conflicts, and, perhaps with
some final intervention of the Supreme Court, the petitions regarding noncompliance with amparo judgments; and,
" Modification of the 'Otero clause' which limits the effects of an amparo
decision in the amparo contra leyes. This change is required for reasons of
efficiency, justice, and equality before the law.
C. Constitutionalinterpretation

The main responsibility of a constitutional court is to interpret the constitution.
The authoritarian presidential system and flexible ambivalence 9" of the Mexican
Constitution has hindered the development of a broad and consistent constitutional
97. Secretarios de estudio y cuenta [court clerks].
98. See Dfaz Dfaz, La Constitucidn ambivalente. Notas para el estudio de sus polos de tensidn, in 80
ANIVERSAmIo. HOMENAJE. CoNsTrrUc6N POLtTICA DE LOS EsTADOS UNmOs MFxtcANos, 59-85 (Instituto de
Investigaciones Juridicas ed. 1997), who argues that in the Constitution of 1917 two models coexist: the orthodox

model of Western constitutionalism, and the authontanan and vertical model that resulted from the acknowledgment
of the heterogeneous and premodern elements in Mexican society and history.
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doctrine." However, under the democratization process occurring in Mexico a
constitutional doctrine may slowly emerge.
Therefore, we are witnessing no less than the beginnings of a real constitutional
debate in our country. The potential parties (and to a much lesser extent, the justices
too) have to undergo a learning process on how to formulate and rigorously discuss
real constitutional issues. Particularly the justices will have to grapple, sooner or
later, with the dilemmas of constitutional justice. These include the need for selfrestraint and the expectations that a more democratic society places on it.
The emerging dialog for change suggests another important question: Do the
Supreme Court justices share a common sense of purpose and direction? There is no
doubt that the present justices agree with the purposes of the 1994 reform and that
the Supreme Court must play a more prominent role in Mexican life. However, when
it comes to controversial legal issues, the general consensus practically breaks down.
Within the court there are essentially two positions or attitudes: the 'prudent' and
the 'innovative.' The former position is mindful of tradition and therefore careful in
analyzing and introducing changes in the existing system.'tu The latter position
perceives the need to adapt more rapidly to a changing world, and is therefore more
eager to explore and incorporate new opinions and interpretations."

It is also more

2
insistent on the new role the Court must play in Mexican society. 10
The two positions or attitudes are not represented by fixed groups of persons
within the Court. However, some justices identify more with one position than with
the other. To an observer impatient with the pace of change, the philosophical
division of the court can only be regarded as a nuisance. Nevertheless, it can also be
seen as a guarantee that more than one opinion will be considered and that the issues
will be more deeply, seriously, and responsibly discussed. This can be an advantage
in a society learning the rules of constitutional debate. In any case, much depends
on the value that society places on such debate and its willingness to invest
intellectual and material resources in it.

V. CONCLUSION
The new formal powers and responsibilities conferred on the Supreme Court
closely correspond to the social and political expectations that are now being placed
on legal institutions and processes. It may still require some time for society to see
the full impact of the judicial reform process. Further, such impact may turn out to

99. Cossfo Dfaz & Raigosa, Rdgimen polico and interpreracidnconstitutional,60 EsTE PAs, 32-41 (1996),
maintain that the authoritarian nature of the Mexican political regime specifically prevented the development of a
constitutional doctrine that could seriously consider the Constitution as a legal norm.
100. A good example of this is the minority opinion in the case where the Court accepted the possibility of
reviewing a constitutional amendment, supra note 80.
101. So, for example, in the minority opinion four justices propose to reverse the Court's traditional
interpretation with respect to the expropriation of private property. They argue that, in view of the process of
economic globalization, it is important that "the highest court of the land -the Supreme Court- facilitates the access
of capitals, eliminating obstacles to the risks that an attack on private property carries" (translation by HFF), in 5 SJF,

May, 378, 382 (1997). See also, the three minority opinions in 6 SJF, August, 435-54 (1997).
102. Sedhe minority opinion in the Ad[ 1/95, supranote 36 at 260, in which the justices expressly state: "For

many years the idea has prevailed that the Supreme Court should be a power to settle the disputes of private citizens;
it is necessary for it to become a power for the sake of the Nation and its purposes."
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be more profound and lasting than the consequences of other more apparent changes.
Hence, impatience is not warranted.
The Mexican democratic transition, of which judicial reform is an important
manifestation, has unfolded for a long time without dramatic ruptures. The old and
the new are forced to coexist, sometimes at odds with each other. As shown by this
article, the trajectory of the Supreme Court in the last three years is a valuable case
in point. There are good reasons to be confident that this important institution will
become a central arena in which the constitutional struggles of Mexican society will
be fought in the future. Review has shown some of these struggles have begun to
emerge and take shape.
For example, the distribution of powers and resources between the different units
and levels of government and the amendments introduced into the federal and state
electoral laws. Notwithstanding this progress, the rigorous redefinition and effective
protection of citizens' fundamental rights is still needed. A thorough reform of the
law of amparo may help to reinforce these rights. Fortunately, not everything has to
wait for tomorrow. Mexico already has a more visible and interesting Supreme
Court.

